Recently, Tian et al. presented an article, in which they discussed some security weaknesses of Yoon et al.'s scheme and subsequently proposed two "improved" schemes. In this paper, we show that the Tian et al.'s schemes are insecure and vulnerable than the Yoon et al.'s scheme.
Introduction
Remote system authentication is a process by which a remote system gains confidence about the identity (or login request) of the communicating partner. Since the introduction of Lamport's scheme [1] , several new proposals and improvements on remote systems authentication [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] have been proposed. Recently, Tian et al. [7] presented an article by observing some flaws of the Yoon et al.'s scheme [8] , and subsequently suggested two improved schemes. The basis of the Tian et al.'s observation on Yoon et al.'s scheme was on this assumption: If an attacker steals a user's smart card and extracts the values stored in it through some means [9] , [10] without being noticed, then the attacker can either masquerade as the user to forge a valid login request, or masquerade as the server to forge a valid reply message. In this paper, we show that the Tian et al.'s schemes are insecure with the above mentioned arguments what they had considered, in fact, more vulnerable than [8] . The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the Tian et al.'s schemes. In section 3, we show the security weaknesses of the schemes. We conclude the paper with the section 4.
The Tian et al.'s Schemes
The schemes consists of four phases: Registration, Login, Authentication and Password change. The registration and password change phases are same for both the schemes.
Registration phase: A new user can register to the remote server by the following steps. R1. A user U i submits his identity ID i and password P W i to the server (S) through a secure channel.
R2. Then S chooses four distinct cryptographic one-way hash functions h(·), h 1 (·), h 2 (·), and h 3 (·).
R3. S computes R
where ⊕ denotes the bitwise exclusive-OR operation.
R4. Then S personalizes a smart card with
> and sends it to U i in a secure manner.
Password change phase: This phase is invoked when a user U i wants to change his password from P W i to P W ′ i . The user attaches his smart card to the card reader and enters P W i , then the smart card performs the following operations: 
P3. Compute X
′ i = R i ⊕ h(ID i , P W ′ i ). Then, store X ′ i in smart card in place of X i .
The First Scheme
This scheme uses the timestamp mechanism to avoid the replay attack (assuming the user and server time synchronization is proper).
Login phase: U i attaches his smart card to the card reader and enters password P W * i . Then the smart card performs the following operations:
with H i . If they are equal, then the smart card proceeds to the next step, otherwise it terminates the operation.
LF4. U i sends the login request < ID i , T, C 1 > to S over a public channel.
Authentication phase: Upon receiving the login request < ID i , T, C 1 >, the server S and the user U i perform the following steps for mutual authentication:
AF1. S checks the validity of ID i and T . If both are correct then proceeds to the next step, otherwise rejects the login request.
AF2. S computes R
If this check holds, S assures that U i is authentic and proceeds to the next step, otherwise it rejects the request.
AF4. Upon receiving S's response message < T ′ , C 2 >, U i 's smart card first checks the validity of T ′ and then whether C 2 = h 2 (ID i , S, R i , T ′ ). If these checks hold, U i assures the authenticity of S and the mutual authentication is done, otherwise it rejects the connection.
AF5. Once the mutual authentication is completed, U i and S use h 3 (ID i , S, R i , T, T ′ ) as the session key.
The Second Scheme
This scheme uses a nonce based challenge-response mechanism, so it avoids the time synchronization problem. Login phase: U i attaches his smart card to the card reader and enters password P W i . Then the smart card performs the following operations:
with H i . If they are equal, proceeds to the next step, otherwise it terminates the operation.
LS3. Send the login request < ID i , N i > to S over a public channel, where N i is a nonce selected by U i .
Authentication phase: Upon receiving the login request < ID i , N i >, the server S and the user U i perform the following steps for mutual authentication:
AS1. S checks the validity of ID i .
AS2. S chooses a nonce
and sends < C 1 , N s > to U i over a public channel.
AS3. Upon receiving < C 1 , N s >, U i checks whether
If this check holds correct, U i assures the authenticity of S, otherwise terminates the operation.
AS4. U i computes C 2 = h 2 (ID i , S, R i , N s , N i ) and sends it to S.
AS5. Upon receiving C 2 , S checks whether C 2 = h 2 (ID i , S, R i , N s , N i ). U i authentic if the check passes and the mutual authentication is done, otherwise S terminates the operation.
AS6. After the mutual authentication, the user and the server use h 3 (ID i , S, R i , N i , N s ) as the session key.
Security Weaknesses
The basis of the following attacks is based on this risk of smart card stored information:
A legitimate user could extract the values stored in smart card by some means [9] , [10] , then he/she could act as the role of server to register any number of users. We note that the Tian et al.'s scheme also assumed a similar risk.
Attacks by a legitimate user
In the registration phase,
Once U i extracts X i from his smart card by some means [9] , [10] , then he/she can easily get R i by computing R i = X i ⊕ h(ID i , P W i ). After that, no remote server is required to register a new user. Now, U i who has R i , could register any number of users by distributing R i and ID i . In fact, smart card and password are not required at all to login S those who got R i and ID i from U i . Because, a valid login message is < ID i , T, C 1 >, where T is a timestamp (for the first scheme) and
For the second scheme, the challenge-response comprises with the secret R i only, other parameters are public. Therefore, the server secret is virtually compromised by a legitimate user's smart card.
Attacks by an adversary
Suppose an attacker steals U i 's smart card and intercepts C 1 = (S, ID i , R i , T ) from a valid login request. Now the attacker extracts the information stored in the smart card and launches an offline guessing attacks of P W i in order to obtain the value of R i . The attacker guesses a password and obtains an R * i , and then checks whether
. Once the guess succeeds, then the attacker has a valid R i and can create any number of valid login request.
3.
No two-factor authentication Two-factor authentication is a technique that requires two independent factors (e.g. password, smart card) to establish identity and privileges. Common implementations of two-factor authentication use 'something you know: password' as one of the two factors, and use either 'something you have: smart card' or 'something you are: biometric' as the other factor. A common example of two-factor authentication is a bank card (credit card, debit card); the card itself is the physical item, and the personal identification number (PIN) is the data that goes with it. In Tian et al.'s scheme, we observe that once a party has information of ID i and R i , then he does not require password and a valid smart card at all. Without password and smart card, one can easily pass the mutual authentication and establish the session key. Therefore, the schemes lack two-factor authentication.
Conclusion
The threat of smart card security [9] , [10] , [11] is a crucial concern, where some secret information is stored in the memory of smart cards. However, to the best of my knowledge, one can still use smart card to store some secret data by considering the applications requirement and scope/value of the secret information stored in the smart card. It is also important to judge the financial cost and time to extract the secret data from the smart card. If the cost as well as time is tolerable or higher than the cost of the secret inside the smart card, then one can take that risk while using smart card to store some secret data. If extracting a secret from the card leads to collapse the whole system (e.g. Tian et al.'s schemes) then definitely some additional counter measure should be taken while designing the scheme. Of course, smart card vendors are quite aware of these threats and they are also taking counter measure continuously to safe guard the cards security. We have shown that the Tian et al.'s scheme is insecure by several weaknesses. Just by extracting a secret data from a smart card can collapse the whole system's security.
